

A DYNAMIC LIFE-COURSE APPROACH TO GENOCIDE

CHRISTOPHER UGGEN
Department of Sociology
University of Minnesota

HOLLIE NYSETH BREHM
Department of Sociology
University of Minnesota and Ohio State University

SUZY MCELRATH
Department of Sociology
University of Minnesota

© Christopher Uggen, Hollie Nyseth Brehm, and Suzy Mcelrath. Permission from the authors is required to reproduce any portion of this manuscript in any format or medium.

Twenty years ago, a small nation experienced a sudden and cataclysmic crime wave. More than a million people were murdered, an estimated 250,000 were raped, countless more were tortured, and thousands of homes were destroyed. We write, of course, of the 1994 genocide targeting the Rwandan Tutsi. Though genocide is often called the “crime of crimes,” few criminologists have systematically examined the events in Rwanda or the many other genocides of the past century. Yet the acts that constitute genocide—murder, rape, torture, and the destruction of property, among others— clearly fall within the professional jurisdiction of criminologists.

This article will argue not only that genocides can and should be studied as crime, but also that criminologists are equipped with a particular set of conceptual and analytic tools that are especially well suited for this task. Specifically, we draw from life-course and career models of crime to outline a criminological model of genocide as a dynamic

sequence of events. Just as life-course thinking has revolutionized the study of more prosaic criminal activities, a dynamic life-course approach to genocide has the potential to simultaneously inform both genocide scholarship and criminology. Using the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as an illustrative example, we show how some of the basic building blocks of life-course criminology operate at the individual, regional, and national levels before, during, and after genocide. These include but are not limited to (1) risk factors and the onset of genocide, (2) the escalation, trajectories, and duration of genocidal violence, and (3) the de-escalation of violence, desistance from genocidal crime, and transitions.

GENOCIDE AS CRIME

Though the term “genocide” most often invokes images of the Holocaust, genocide predates the 20th century and has long been implicated in conquest. Indeed, many empires expanded their boundaries through genocidal means that were, at one time, understood as routine or celebrated as heroic (Savelsberg, 2010:18-19). Over time, however, the actions that constitute genocide have come to be viewed as unacceptable, and a new label was needed to criminalize such actions at an international level (Sikkink, 2011).

Inspired by events in Armenia in the early 1900s, as well as events taking place in contemporary Germany and Poland, a Polish-Jewish lawyer named Rafael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in the early 1940s (Power, 2003). Specifically, Lemkin defined genocide as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Power, 2003:43). After much political lobbying by Lemkin and

others, the United Nations adopted the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in December 1948. This treaty defines genocide in terms of “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such...” (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948). This international legal definition has been upheld in subsequent documents of international law (such as the Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court), though genocide scholars have also expanded the definition in numerous ways.

Several criminologists were highly invested in the criminalization of genocidal violence. For example, Sheldon Glueck—known today for his criminal careers research with Eleanor Glueck—helped lay the foundation for the Nuremberg Trials, which prosecuted prominent leaders of Nazi Germany. In fact, the chief American prosecutor at Nuremberg stated that Glueck’s “original plan is substantially the system pursued throughout the Nuremberg Trial” (Rheinstein, 1947:319). Yet, as Hagan and Raymond-Richmond (2008, 2009) explain, few American criminologists followed Glueck’s lead. Instead, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, genocide took a backseat to American crime and, in particular, juvenile delinquency in the wake of the post-World War II baby boom.

Despite its marginal status within criminology, genocide is a crime that breaks international law and causes great harm, thus meeting criteria of crime both as a violation of criminal law (Sutherland, Cressey, and Luckenbill, 1992:4) and as a form of social harm (Hillyard and Tombs, 2007; Presser, 2013). As noted above, while genocide is constituted by a collection of actions, many discrete acts committed during genocide—

such as murder or rape—are crimes. In fact, all of the Part I offenses listed in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program were committed during the genocide in Rwanda.

Genocide also has much in common with other forms of crime. Like hate crime (Jenness and Grattet, 2004), genocide is defined by actions taken against an ethnic, religious, or other social group. Like war crime and state-corporate crime, genocide is often perpetrated by the state. Like gang-related crime and conspiracy, genocide is typically perpetrated through co-offending, often in obedience to higher-ranking members within a hierarchical authority structure. Many similar comparisons could be made, but the key point is this: genocide is crime. The sum of its parts constitutes the crime of genocide, and many mechanisms of genocide are crimes by any standard. In addition, while genocide is distinct, it bears great resemblance to other crimes. As such, criminological theories may inform the study of genocide, which may simultaneously expand and inform the boundaries of criminology.

GENOCIDE, CAREERS AND LIFE COURSE THINKING

In line with this, a number of criminologists *have* begun to study the crime of genocide. Some of these scholars have applied well-tested theories (e.g., Alvarez, 1997; Savelsberg, 2010), while others are developing new models (see, e.g., Brannigan and Hardwick, 2003; Meierhenrich, 2006; Hagan and Raymond-Richmond, 2008, 2009; Campbell, 2011; Rafter and Walklate, 2012; Shute, 2012). Yet, a criminology of genocide is far from established, such that potentially valuable innovations—including those in career and life-course criminology—have yet to be incorporated into genocide studies.

While life-course and career perspectives are varied, these approaches are generally distinguished by their emphasis on change rather than stability and an

understanding of individual lives as situated within larger historical and structural contexts. Rather than neatly dividing the world into fixed categories of offenders and non-offenders, for example, life course and career approaches explicitly model transitions into and out of crime. As importantly, these perspectives demonstrate that these changes follow predictable patterns that are structured by various dimensions of time, such as age, cohort, and historical period. As genocides represent intense episodes of social change, this is well in line with genocide scholarship that emphasizes how patterns and structure can be found within seemingly unthinkable, chaotic events and processes.

In the past three decades, developments in conceptualization, data, and measurement have dramatically expanded the explanatory power of career and life-course perspectives and, consequently, criminology's ability to situate individual lives within larger institutional contexts (Blumstein, 1987; Laub and Sampson, 1993). For example, life-course research provides instructive examples for researchers analyzing complex problems that operate at multiple levels of analysis. Works such as Glen Elder's (1974, see also 1985) *Children of the Great Depression* have masterfully demonstrated how social-structural upheaval affected individual lives across two generations. Sampson and Laub (1996) similarly showed how structural interventions like the GI Bill shaped military service as a turning point in individual criminal careers. Genocide is similarly a complex social process that is influenced by many forces at different levels of analysis. Analyses of genocide necessarily consider states and regions (Fein, 1993; Harff, 2003; Weitz, 2003; Su, 2011; Nyseth Brehm, 2014a), organizations and networks (Browning, 1998; Hatzfeld, 2006; Fujii, 2009), individual targets and perpetrators (Goldhagen, 1996; Browning, 1998; Straus, 2006; Collins, 2008), as well as the

interactions of these and other levels with one another (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2008, 2009; Su, Snow, and Owens, 2013).

Each level of analysis also has a temporal dimension, and life-course and career approaches are well suited to analyzing processes that unfold dynamically on different “clocks.” Indeed, genocide scholars often emphasize that genocide is a process, though numerous tools from these theories can complement this approach. For example, rather than emphasizing static distinctions between offenders and non-offenders, career perspectives attend to entry, continuation, and exit, all of which could be applied to better understand perpetrators of genocide. In addition, such perspectives recognize that factors predicting the onset of crime like genocide may differ from those responsible for its escalation or persistence. Desistance from crime—and, in this case, genocide—likewise entails much more than simply inverting the initial conditions that may have produced it (Uggen and Piliavin, 1997), again suggesting that life-course and career perspectives align well with the dynamic process of genocide.

Life-course criminologists analyze these complex, dynamic phenomena in order to glean insights into why people commit crime or why violence occurs. In this way, longitudinal career researchers draw attention to a related asymmetry in understanding genocide, this time regarding prospective and retrospective research (Sampson and Laub, 1993). Looking backward, almost all nations that experienced genocide may share certain characteristics, such as a recent history of political instability. Yet, these risk factors are not necessarily reliable predictors of genocide prospectively. This is a “false positive” problem in which many nations at risk of genocide fail to transition to genocide. In view of the complexity and state-dependence of the events preceding genocide (Farrington, 2003; Nagin and Paternoster, 1991; 2000), researchers are far

from developing a complete predictive model. As in life course research, however, fine-grained analysis of trajectories and potential turning points could yield enormous practical benefits and scientific insights (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012).

Finally, analysis of the basic structure of individual criminal careers reveals much about how the total toll of crime depends greatly on a few key parameters. These include the rate of participation in the population and, among active participants, the timing of onset, termination, and mean number of offenses committed per unit time, all factors that similarly also influence the toll of genocide. As Marvin Wolfgang and colleagues (1972) famously discovered, a small percentage of the population can be responsible for a large share of criminal activity: 35 percent of the males in the 1945 Philadelphia birth cohort had at least one police contact, but only 6 percent of this cohort was responsible for a full 52 percent of the offenses.

Such findings highlight the important distinction, for both criminology and genocide studies, between the rate of participation (or prevalence) and the frequency (or incidence) of criminal acts. With regard to the latter, disrupting the careers of a relatively small number of high-rate offenders and influential leaders can produce significant reductions in the overall number of acts committed. Relatedly, most crime, like most acts of genocide, is committed with others or on others' behalf (Reiss, 1988), such that the structure of co-offender networks influences the type and frequency of acts committed (Browning, 1998; Mueller, 2000; McGloin and Piquero, 2010). Knowledge about co-offending patterns is therefore an important tool in identifying and disrupting such group offending.

Whether these and other concepts and advances are useful in explaining genocide remains an open question, as does the extent to which the study of genocide can expand,

challenge, and inform criminology. To illustrate some of the promise and potential pitfalls in applying life-course criminology to genocide, we consider the case of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. We consider several levels of analysis—including national, regional, and individual levels—over time. For each, we illustrate how some of the building blocks of life-course criminology might productively advance knowledge about why genocide occurs and dispel uncertainties surrounding what is clearly a complex, dynamic crime.

BEFORE GENOCIDE: RISK FACTORS AND ONSET

Just as longitudinal research on crime begins before the onset of criminal behavior (e.g., White et al., 1990), cases of genocide—as well as negative cases—can and should be analyzed well before they begin. Indeed, while it was once thought that genocide took place without warning, genocide scholars have begun to identify certain national-level risk factors that influence whether and when genocide occurs (Fein, 1993; Krain, 1997; Harff, 2003). In Rwanda, the road to genocide began almost a century before the violence unfolded. The 1884 Berlin Conference assigned the territory of Rwanda to Germany, marking the beginning of the colonial era. As World War I drew to a close, Germany lost territory, and Belgium became the colonial authority. Almost immediately, Belgian colonists displayed favoritism toward the Tutsi, one of three commonly recognized ethnic groups in Rwanda and an ethnic minority (Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995; des Forges, 1999).¹ In the 1930s, Belgian colonial officials asked Rwandan citizens to declare an ethnicity—printed on ID cards that were to be carried

¹ The precise origins of these ethnic groups are widely debated in academic literature on Rwanda, though scholars agree that the categories existed before the advent of colonialism (e.g., Cornell and Hartmann 2006).

everywhere—and enacted several policies that benefited Tutsi elites. Colonial officials also attempted to document the phenotypical characteristics associated with ethnic identities. As the recent lineage of Rwandan Kings were Tutsi and as Tutsis were thought to have comparatively lighter skin, many Belgians subscribed to the notion of Tutsis as members the Hamitic race, a Eurocentric idea that Tutsis were from Northern Africa and consequently superior to Hutus (Reyntjens, 1996).

As independence drew near, however, colonial authorities shifted their support to Rwandan Hutus, who had begun to express discontent at what they perceived as years of mistreatment and marginalization despite their numerical majority. A Hutu emancipation movement emerged, culminating in Rwandan independence in 1962 and the institution of the First Republic, led by a Hutu President. This reversed the power structure in society. Much sporadic violence against Tutsis followed, as Tutsis were generally blamed for Hutus' previous marginalization and lack of power (Prunier, 1995; Straus, 2006). In 1973, a senior officer in the army named Juvénal Habyarimana came to power through a coup d'état and established the Second Republic. While attacks against Tutsis diminished, systematic discrimination against Tutsis increased, with much anti-Tutsi discrimination in the public sector. Tensions escalated in 1990 when a Tutsi-led army, known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded Rwanda.

The attack placed great strain on the Habyarimana regime. It also offered Habyarimana a way to garner support by rallying Rwandans against the RPF and, by extension, all Tutsis. After a year and a half of violence, peace negotiations—known as the Arusha Accords—began. Yet, sporadic violence and much inflammatory rhetoric against Tutsis persisted, and even though the peace process moved forward, it was clear

that many within the government feared losing power through the peace process (Longman, 1995; Melvern, 2006).


Then, on April 6, 1994, unknown assailants shot President Habyarimana's plane as it was landing in the capital of Rwanda. The resulting plane crash killed the occupants of the plane immediately, and several hours later, targeted killing of Tutsi leaders, as well as moderate Hutus, began. This plane crash is often cited as the cause of the genocide, though as this brief explanation has illustrated, multiple risk factors influenced the onset of genocide in Rwanda in April 1994. Notably, many of these factors are consistently identified as general risk factors for genocide, including civil war, tensions surrounding the ethnicity of leaders, and ideologies that dehumanized and excluded segments of the population (Fein, 1993; Harff, 2003; Nyseth Brehm, 2014a). Nonetheless, genocidal violence in Rwanda did not begin until after the crash. Catalysts that trigger the onset of violence may account for some of the difficulty of predicting whether, or when, a genocide will occur.

Although the episode of genocide began several hours after the plane crashed, the onset and diffusion of violence at regional levels varied. In fact, violence did not begin in areas of Rwanda until several weeks later (see Straus, 2006 for a prefecture-level analysis of 11 regions and Nyseth Brehm, 2014b for a commune-level analysis of 145 communes). Indeed, as Figure 1² illustrates, each community had its own "clock" during the genocide, with onset beginning almost immediately in some places and well over two weeks later in others. Numerous factors can influence such intra-country differences in the onset date of genocidal violence. For example, many of the communes with the latest

² See Nyseth Brehm 2014b for a detailed description of the data used to create this figure and additional information on the communities without data (which had low levels of violence).

onset fell within a region in which the Tutsi governor was able to delay the start of genocidal violence for several weeks.

Figure 1: Commune Onset of Genocidal Violence in 1994 Rwanda



At the individual level of analysis, in line with much life-course criminology, the onset (or initiation) of genocidal violence can be viewed at the level of perpetrators and victims. Recent estimates suggest that more than one million people participated in the genocide by planning its onset, killing their neighbors, or looting homes (Gacaca, 2012). Yet, in addition to regional variation in onset, individuals began participating in the violence at different times, with some committing crimes within the first hours of the genocide and others first committing crimes many weeks later. In other work, we show that the risk of participation in the violence was also structured by age (Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo, 2012), paralleling the age-crime relation observed across many types of criminal offending. Other risk factors for the type and timing of individual

participation are likely to include sex, employment, network affiliations, and marital status.

In line with an individual-focused approach, genocide scholars have sought to profile people who participate in genocide (Adorno, 1950; Hughes, 1963; Goldhagen, 1996; Browning, 1998; Mann, 2000; Verwimp, 2005; Straus, 2006; Fujii, 2009). Many genocide researchers have argued that people who participate in genocide are, in many ways, average individuals who act rationally. Yet, these theories could be extended by life course-inspired analyses of the structural and social influences on the lives of people who commit genocide. For example, our examination of the age distribution of people who were tried by the *gacaca* courts—the local level courts that tried people accused of participating in the genocide in Rwanda—finds that approximately 75 percent of the genocidal crimes in Rwanda were committed by men between the ages of 18 and 45 (Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo, 2012). This suggests that traditional theories about age-graded and gender-specific informal social controls, such as entry into work and family roles (Laub and Sampson, 1993), may point to risk factors for initiation of genocidal violence at the individual level. In addition, multi-level frameworks could reveal interactions among the individual, regional, national, and other risk factors predicting genocide onset.


DURING GENOCIDE: ESCALATION, TRAJECTORIES, AND DURATION

Once genocidal violence in Rwanda began, the situation escalated extremely quickly. Many massacres took place within the first few days. Others, taking the lives of tens of thousands of people—such as the massacres at churches in Nyarubuye and Nyamata—occurred within weeks of the plane crash. Understanding the trajectory of

these and other events may yield many insights into what drove the violence, how it unfolded, and, possibly, its magnitude.

For example, Christian Davenport and Allan Stam’s Genodynamics Project (2008, 2012) sought to ascertain the number of people killed over time during the violence in Rwanda. Using data from six sources and Bayesian methodology (see Davenport and Stam, 2008 for details), they estimated the number of people killed each day throughout the genocide. As the graph below illustrates, their data suggest that killing was the most intense throughout the first month of the violence, though more work remains in determining what influenced the escalation of violence in April and its subsequent decline.

Figure 2. Killings per Day in Rwanda³



³ Their data include estimates based on different combinations of sources. These estimates were obtained from the website in 2012 and include all six sources (Davenport and Stam, 2012).


While the exact numbers in the figure are estimates, it is clear that the killings followed a clear trajectory. In fact, the ebbs and flows in many forms of violence—such as forced displacement or rape—could be analyzed, were data available to do so, and these trajectories may diverge in ways that would inform both scientific knowledge and global responses. These temporal patterns are also likely impacted by turning points in the violence, such as interventions by international actors or even the actions of particular leaders within communities.

In addition, these trajectories could also be analyzed and compared at regional levels (or even by community or neighborhood). Figure 3,⁴ for example, shows that the pattern of violence within Kibuye, a region in Western Rwanda, shared many similarities with the aggregate country-level trajectory of violence. Again, life-course criminology could inform the study of these trajectories. A comparison of trajectories across communities could distinguish those marked by early and late onset and by the chronic or episodic nature of the violence. Regional and community level trajectories may also have been influenced by particular organizations. For example, the *Interhamwe*, a youth arm of a political party, traveled around the country and was one of many organizations—some previously formed, others more spontaneous—that participated in the violence. Their actions likely influenced aggregate patterns, and their patterns of crime throughout the genocide could similarly be studied. Such work is an important step toward identifying the determinants of both escalation and desistance.

⁴ As in Figure 2, data for this figure were obtained on the Genodynamics website and are from estimates including all of Davenport and Stam's sources (Davenport and Stam 2012).

Each figure also illustrates the duration of violence at both national and regional levels. Compared to other genocides that have spanned years, the duration of the genocidal violence in Rwanda was relatively short. Duration of violence within a community also varied, with violence raging for months in one community but only for a matter of weeks in another. Yet, while duration is an important consideration in life course and career research, it is quite distinct from magnitude or severity. In this case, the intensity of the genocide in Rwanda surpasses that of most other genocides that have occurred in modern times. To date, there has been little discussion of the relationship between duration and intensity at different levels of analysis, though such research could prove useful for both descriptive and analytic purposes.

Figure 3. Killings per day in Kibuye Province



Individual-level trajectories may also yield insights into the violence. While many scholars have speculated about who participates in genocidal violence, few have traced the trajectories of participants – in part, because of the sheer methodological difficulty of doing so. Yet, as Fujii’s (2009:11) dynamic approach to participation in genocide suggests, multiple contexts, identities, and motives influence individual actors during genocidal violence. While genocide scholars routinely place people into categories such as “victim,” “perpetrator,” or “bystander,” these categories are not mutually exclusive in reality. Rather, a Rwandan may have killed a neighbor and saved the life of another neighbor, perhaps within the course of a single day (Fujii, 2009).

The rate of offending also varies during genocidal violence (Mueller, 2000). Some committed one murder, while others likely traveled around Rwanda, becoming known as notorious killers. There were undoubtedly both low-rate and high-rate offenders, though little is currently known about their trajectories or the distinguishing characteristics of these groups. In addition, while all participation in the genocide could be seen as short term—as the genocide lasted only a matter of months—participation in genocide could also be analyzed as events within the individual life course. This would help to distinguish the “ordinary men”—short-term offenders with no previous criminal record—from those whose participation in genocide occurred within a longer line of criminal activities.

AFTER GENOCIDE: DE-ESCALATION, TRANSITIONS, AND DESISTANCE

Finally, we briefly consider how life-course criminology may enrich understanding of events and processes that take place after the genocide has ended, as

well the longer-term moral careers of individuals, groups, and nations. Before doing so, though, we note that it is often difficult to pinpoint the precise “ending” of genocide—just as it is difficult to identify a particular moment in which an individual desists from criminal behavior (Maruna, 2001). In Rwanda, the genocide was declared over when the RPF (the rebel army of Tutsis that had been at war with Rwanda before the genocide began) captured the capital of Rwanda in July 1994. Yet, in line with most other “endings” of genocide, this reflects a nation-level approach, as violence within some communities extended beyond the “official” ending of the violence (des Forges, 1999).

More broadly, the study of how genocide ends is a significant lacuna within genocide studies (Amadi et al., 2006). Historical narratives illustrate that genocides may end when perpetrators accomplish their goals, as was the case of the genocide of the Herero and Namaqua in German Southwest Africa. While this is still possible today, nongovernmental organizations, diplomats, and leaders often call upon prominent nations or international organizations to respond and criticize them for failing to act (Power, 2003). Indeed, some genocides, such as the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ended shortly after foreign intervention in the violence. Yet, such interventions typically focus exclusively at the national level. Recognizing local-level dynamics of violence, and opportunities for peace negotiations, may facilitate the cooling of local-level “hotspots” of persisting violence (Autesserre, 2010; Braithwaite, 2012).

No matter how genocides come to an end, the de-escalation of violence at both the state and more local levels represents a process rather than a discrete event. Institutional responses directed at the state level may include international transitional governments or the long-term presence of military or civilian peace forces, such as in East Timor. They may also include Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

(DDR) programs that scale-down or eliminate state or non-state armed forces and reintegrate individuals into the economic and social fabric to lower the risk of renewed violence. This process is increasingly aided by transitional justice mechanisms, or mechanisms intended to facilitate a country's transition from a mass atrocity to a more democratic, peaceful state (Sikkink, 2011). Transitional justice may include both punitive and restorative measures, such as trials, truth commissions, lustration, and reparations to redress past actions and facilitate reconciliation.⁵ Cumulatively, these efforts contribute to the construction of collective memories that both acknowledge and shame acts of genocide, a process that in itself may help interrupt "cycles of violence" (Minow, 1998; Sikkink, 2011; Savelsberg and King, 2011).

Though these mechanisms often function at the state level, they also influence communities and individuals. In Rwanda, for example, those deemed most culpable for the violence were sent to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, an ad-hoc international tribunal created by the United Nations Security Council and located in Arusha, Tanzania. Many others were tried by the *gacaca* courts, referenced earlier as the local-level courts that tried people who were accused of participating in the violence. Conducted by community members, these courts completed almost two million trials (Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo, forthcoming).

At the individual level, each person who participated in the genocide desisted from this form of violence. For some, desistance took place during the violence, such as when an individual decided to stop participating or to participate only once. For others,

⁵ By reconciliation, a term that is debated among scholars and often lacks conceptual clarity, we refer to a process hoped to repair social relations in order to facilitate long-term individual and collective desistance from inter-group violence. See Meierhenrich (2008) on varieties of reconciliation.

the desistance was extrinsic and perhaps came when the genocide ended. Yet others likely continued sporadic attacks on Tutsis after the violence and, perhaps, engaged in other criminal activities stemming from their participation in genocide. Further research on these individual and historical trajectories would clearly advance knowledge on both particular genocides and the process of desistance from genocide more generally.

Overall, transitional justice is both a part of this sequence and a process unto itself, occurring at multiple levels of analysis, though the historical focus has been on sanctioning individuals rather than groups, communities, or states. Ultimately, its goal is to facilitate desistance from genocide and reintegration for both individuals and nations. The influence of domestic policies (such as lustration, prosecution, amnesty, and unity laws) and international measures (such as international criminal courts and tribunals) has yet to be firmly documented in the academic literature. Nevertheless, proponents of such measures suggest that they could play a pivotal role in ensuring the cessation of genocide and preventing the sort of “chronic” or “zigzag” careers that confound criminologists (Laub and Sampson, 2003).

THE COURSE OF GENOCIDE

Life-course and career approaches offer an under-utilized set of tools that build upon the foundation of genocide scholarship. These include delineating risk factors and the onset of genocide; the escalation, trajectories, and duration of genocidal violence; and the de-escalation of violence and desistance from genocidal crime. While genocide has long been studied as a dynamic process, the approach we suggest here can help

reveal hidden facets of this path-dependent sequence while expanding the boundaries of both genocide studies and criminology. Both criminologists and genocide researchers have much to gain in such collaborations.

References

- Adorno, Theodor W. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.
- Amadi, Sam (Contributor), Besteman, Catherine (Contributor), Conley-Zilkic, Bridget (Contributor), de Waal, Alex (Contributor), Greenberg, Melanie (Contributor), Moses, Dirk (Contributor), Mutengesa, Sabiiti (Contributor) and Slim, Hugo (Contributor). 2006. *How Genocides End Essay Forum*. New York: Social Science Research Council.
- Autesserre, Séverine. 2010. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Blumstein, Alfred, Jacqueline Cohen, Jeffrey Roth, and Christy Visher. 1986. *Criminal Careers and "Career Criminals."* Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
- Brannigan, Augustine, and Kelly H. Hardwick. 2003. Genocide and general theory. In *Control Theories in Crime and Delinquency*, eds. Chester L. Britt and Michael R. Goffredson. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Braithwaite, John. 2012. Cascades of violence and a global criminology of place. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 45:299-315.
- Browning, Christopher R. 1998. *Ordinary Men: Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*. New York: Harper Collins, 2nd edition.
- Campbell, Bradley. 2011. Genocide as a matter of degree. *The British Journal of Sociology* 62: 586–612.
- Collins, Randall. 2008. *Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 1948. 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951.

- Cornell, Stephen, and Douglass Hartmann. 2006. *Ethnicity and Race, Second Edition: Making Identities in a Changing World*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
- Davenport, Christian and Allan Stam. 2012. "Data on violence in 1994." *Genodynamics*. Accessed at www.genodynamics.com in May 2012.
- Davenport, Christian, and Allan Stam. 2008. *Rwandan political violence in space and time*. Unpublished Manuscript.
- des Forges, Alison. 1999. *Leave none to tell the story: Genocide in Rwanda*. *Human Rights Watch*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Dugan, Laura, and Erica Chenoweth. 2012. Moving beyond deterrence: The effectiveness of raising the expected utility of abstaining from terrorism in Israel. *American Sociological Review* 77(4):597-624.
- Elder, Glen. 1974. *Children of the Great Depression*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Elder, Glen. 1985. Perspectives on the life course. In *Life Course Dynamics*, ed. G.H. Elder. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Farrington, David. 2003. Developmental and life-course criminology: Key theoretical and empirical issues – The 2002 Sutherland award address. *Criminology* 41(2):221-56.
- Fein, Helen. 1993. *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective*. London: Sage Publications.
- Fujii, Lee Ann. 2009. *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Gacaca 2012. *Report of the activities of the Gacaca courts*. Kigali: National Gacaca Services of Rwanda.

- Glueck, Sheldon. 1946. *The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Goldhagen, Daniel J. 1996. *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Hagan, John, and Wenona Rymond-Richmond. 2008. The collective dynamics of racial dehumanization and genocidal victimization in Darfur. *American Sociological Review* 6:875-902.
- Hagan, John, and Wenona Rymond-Richmond. 2009. *Darfur and the Crime of Genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hagan, John, Wenona Rymond-Richmond, and Patricia Parker. 2005. The criminology of genocide: the death and rape of Darfur. *Criminology* 43(3):525-61.
- Hagan, John, Heather Schoenfeld, and Alberto Palloni. 2006. The science of human rights, war crimes, and humanitarian emergencies. *Annual Review of Sociology* 32:329-49.
- Harff, Barbara. 2003. No lessons learned from the holocaust? Assessing risks of genocide and political mass murder since 1955. *American Political Science Review* 97:57-73.
- Hatzfeld, Jean. 2006. *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak*. New York: Picador.
- Hillyard, Paddy, and Steve Tombs. 2007. From 'crime' to social harm? *Crime, Law and Social Change* 4(1-2):9-25.
- Hughes, Everett. 1963. Good People and Dirty Work. In *The Other Side*, ed. Howard Becker. New York: Free Press.

- Jenness, Valerie, and Ryken Grattet. 2004. *Making Hate a Crime: From Social Movement to Law Enforcement*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Karstedt, Susanne. 2013. Contextualizing mass atrocity crimes: Moving toward a relational approach. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 9:383-404.
- Krain, Matthew. 1997. State-sponsored mass murder: the onset and severity of genocides and politicides. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(3):331-60.
- Laub, John H., and Robert J. Sampson. 1993. Turning points in the life course: Why change matters to the study of crime. *Criminology* 31:301-25.
- Laub, John H., and Robert J. Sampson. 2003. *Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives: Delinquent Boys to Age 70*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Longman, Timothy. 1995. Genocide and socio-political change: Massacres in two Rwandan villages. *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 23:18-21.
- Daniel Maier-Katkin, Dan Mears, Thomas J. Bernard. 2009. Towards a criminology of crimes against humanity. *Theoretical Criminology* 13: 227-56.
- Mann, Michael. 2000. Were the perpetrators of genocide “ordinary men” or “real Nazis”? Results from fifteen hundred biographies. *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 14(3):331-66.
- Maruna, Shadd. 2001. *Making Good: How Ex-Convicts Reform and Rebuild Their Lives*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- McGloin, Jean M., and Alex R. Piquero. 2010. On the relationship between co-offending network redundancy and offending versatility. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 47:63-90.
- Meierhenrich, Jens. 2006. Conspiracy in international law. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 2:341-57.

- Meierhenrich, Jens. 2008. Varieties of reconciliation. *Law and Social Inquiry* 33:195-231.
- Melvern, Linda. 2006. *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide*. New York: Verso.
- McGloin, Jean M., and Alex R. Piquero. 2010. On the relationship between co-offending network redundancy and offending versatility. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 47:63-90.
- Minow, Martha. 1998. *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Mueller, John. 2000. The banality of 'ethnic war.' *International Security* 25(1):42-70.
- Nagin, Daniel, and Raymond Paternoster. 1991. On the relationship of past to future participation in delinquency. *Criminology* 29(2):163-89.
- Nagin, Daniel, and Raymond Paternoster. 2000. Population heterogeneity and state dependence: State of the evidence and directions for future research. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 16(2):117-44.
- Newbury, Catharine. 1998. Ethnicity and the politics of history in Rwanda. *Africa Today* 45(1):7-24.
- Nyseth Brehm, Hollie. 2014a. Assessing risk factors of modern genocide. Unpublished.
- Nyseth Brehm, Hollie. 2014b. *Conditions and Courses of Genocide*. Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota.
- Nyseth Brehm, Hollie, Christopher Uggen, and Jean-Damascene Gasanabo. Forthcoming. Genocide, justice, and Rwanda's *gacaca* courts. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, eds. Steven F. Messner and Ryan D. King.

- Nyseth Brehm, Hollie, Christopher Uggen, and Jean-Damascene Gasanabo. 2012. Age, sex, and the crime of genocide. Paper presented at the 2012 meetings of the American Society of Criminology.
- Owens, Peter B., Yan Su, and David A. Snow. 2013. Social scientific inquiry into genocide and mass killing: from unitary outcome to complex process. *Annual Review of Sociology* 39:69-84.
- Power, Samantha. 2003. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
- Presser, Lois. 2013. *Why We Harm*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Prunier, Gerard. 1995. *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide*. London: Hurst.
- Rafter, Nicole, and Sandra Walklate. 2012. Genocide and the dynamics of victimization: some observations on Armenia. *European Journal of Criminology* 9:514-26.
- Reiss, Albert. 1988. Co-offending and criminal careers. In *Crime and Justice*, vol. 10, eds. Norval Morris and Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Reyntjens, Filip. 1996. Rwanda: Genocide and beyond. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 9:240-51.
- Rheinstein, Max. 1947. The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, by Sheldon Glueck. *The University of Chicago Law Review* 14(2):319-21.
- Sampson, Robert J., and John H. Laub. 1993. *Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points through Life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sampson, Robert J., and John H. Laub. 1996. Socioeconomic achievement in the life course of disadvantaged men: Military service as a turning point, circa 1940-1965. *American Sociological Review* 61(3):347-67.

- Savelsberg, Joachim J. 2010. *Crime and Human Rights*. London: SAGE.
- Savelsberg, Joachim J., and Ryan D. King. 2005. Institutionalizing collective memories of hate: law and law enforcement in Germany and the United States. *American Journal of Sociology* 111:579-616.
- Savelsberg, Joachim J., and Ryan D. King. 2011. *American Memories: Atrocities and the Law*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Shute, Jon. 2012. Towards a criminology of mass violence and the body. In *Corpses of Mass Violence: The Unthought and the Unsaid*, 43-55. Paris: Petra.
- Sikkink, Kathryn. 2011. *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics*. WW Norton & Company.
- Straus, Scott. 2006. *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Su, Yang. 2011. *Collective Killings in China during the Cultural Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sutherland, Edwin H., Donald R. Cressey, and David F. Luckenbill. 1992. *Principles of Criminology*, 11th edition. Lanham, MD: General Hall.
- Uggen, Christopher, and Irving Piliavin. 1997. Asymmetrical causation and criminal desistance. *Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology* 88:1399-1422.
- Verwimp, Philip. 2005. An economic profile of peasant perpetrators of genocide: Micro-level evidence from Rwanda. *Journal of Development Economics* 77(2):297-323.
- Weitz, Eric. 2003. *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

White, Jennifer L., Terrie E. Moffitt, Felton Earls, Lee Robins, and Phil A. Silva. 1990.

How early can we tell?: predictors of childhood conduct disorder and adolescent delinquency. *Criminology* 28:507-35.

Wolfgang, Marvin, Robert Figlio, and Thorsten Sellin. 1972. *Delinquency in a Birth Cohort*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.